CoopEval - No Mechanism: leaderboard
Mean payoff of an LLM agent on CoopEval (2026) in one-shot social dilemmas with no cooperation mechanism, averaged over Prisoners Dilemma, Public Goods, Travelers Dilemma and Trust Game against a population of the other tested LLM agents, each told to maximize its own points. Normalized payoff where 0 is mutual defection and 1 is full cooperation (open scale: below 0 when exploited, above 1 with side payments); higher is better.
Metric: Normalized mean payoff (open scale; below 0 when exploited, above 1 possible under side payments) under no cooperation mechanism (one-shot games), aggregated over four social dilemmas (Prisoner's Dilemma, Public Goods, Traveler's Dilemma, Trust Game) after shifting and rescaling payoffs so that 0 is everyone defecting and 1 is everyone playing the most cooperative action; the model's mean payoff across all cross-play match-ups with the six tested LLM agents (a uniform population), each instructed to maximize its own points, temperature 1, three repeats per combination; higher is better. Source: arxiv.org. Saturation forecast: Around June 2027. 5 models tracked. Updated 7 Oct 2026.
Top models
| # | Model | Setting | Score | Overall rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | GPT-5.2 | Low | 0.143 | #190 |
| 2 | Gemini 3 Flash | Non-reasoning | 0.133 | #180 |
| 3 | Claude Sonnet 4.5 | Low | 0.111 | #267 |
| 4 | Qwen 3 30B A3B 2507 Instruct | 0.09 | #1106 | |
| 5 | GPT-4o (2024-05-13) | -0.132 | #740 |
No result here: #2 Claude Fable 5.2, #3 Gemini 4 Neon, #4 GPT-6.2 Astra.
Interactive version: theaggregate.ai/benchmark?slug=coopeval-no-mechanism · How It Works · Data refreshed daily, snapshot 2026-11-22.